A terrorist attack on a train carrying waste nuclear materials across Britain could spread lethal radioactivity across an area of 100 sq kilometres, and result in the deaths of up to 8,000 people, according to a new report released this week.
Spent nuclear fuel is routinely transported by train from nine nuclear power stations around the country to the Sellafield storage facility in Cumbria. Typically these journeys take place once a week from each reactor - at the same time and on the same lines as regular passenger and freight trains.
'Report into the risks of nuclear transportation in the UK', published this week by nuclear engineers John Large & Associates, investigates the potential threat that a terrorist attack or serious accident might pose to one of these consignments. Their findings do not make comfortable reading either for train-travelling public, the government, or the nuclear industry.
Vulnerability to terrorism
The report concludes that the technology and resources needed to mount a successful attack are well within the capabilities of determined terrorists, because:- the rail network along which the spent fuel flasks travel is virtually impossible to defend with absolute certainty;
- nuclear trains carry no apparent extra security, and they travel regular, timetabled routes;
- the transportation flasks could easily be punctured by an armoured piercing explosive round. This kind of attack, especially if followed by a fierce fire within the confines of a tunnel, would cause a very significant radioactive release to the environment;
- numerous portable anti-tank weapons, capable of being handled by one or two individuals, are capable of breaching flask walls.
Inadequate testing of nuclear flasks
Dr Large is also highly critical of accident simulation tests performed on the flasks, which show that not only are they unlikely to survive a serious fire or collision intact, but that none have ever been tested under sabotage scenarios:- flasks are dropped from a height of 9m onto solid floor, simulating an impact velocity of 30 miles per hour - clearly inadequate when trains routinely travel over bridges 25m high at speeds of up to 50 mph;
- In 1998 it was revealed that a type of flask regularly in use had failed 3 successive drop tests earlier in that year;
- flasks are fire-tested to 800 degrees C for 30 minutes, but tunnel fires can reach much higher temperatures for longer periods. In 1984 a railway petrol tanker fire in the Summit tunnel, near Manchester, burned for over 2 days reaching temperatures of 8000 degrees C.
To examine just one of these worst case scenarios considered by Dr Large in more detail: if a nuclear train were attacked inside London's Hampstead Heath tunnel, then the Royal Free Hospital and two primary schools (all less that 250m away) would be immediately affected; local residents from as far away as Finchley and Westminster would need to be evacuated; while across the rest of the capital hundreds of thousands of people would have to shelter indoors from the radioactive plume. In reality, there is no emergency plan in place to cope with such a large-scale evacuation. Greenpeace is currently seeking to challenge the government over the legality of this appalling state of affairs.
Dr Large predicts that "The psychological, societal and economic impacts on Britain would be catastrophic - in a city like London, economic activity would cease in the area contaminated by the plume, no-go areas would be created inhibiting the movement of people and transport systems, tourism would collapse, and parts of the city could be uninhabitable for years unless effective decontamination was completed - which will almost certainly be at great cost and health detriment to the personnel involved. In London this cost is estimated at ﾣ8.5bn."
These inherent potential dangers are intensified by the knowledge that the terrorists who bombed London last July had reportedly been gathering detailed information about nuclear installations and radioactive materials in the months before they struck.
Given the government's own well publicised fears that we will almost certainly face further terrorist attacks, it's hard to see how they can justify transporting nuclear waste around Britain with such minimal protection. Not only that, but they are seriously considering building a new series of nuclear plants as part of the current Energy Review - plants which would produce even more intensely concentrated and dangerous radioactive wastes than those which are currently in production. The United Nations nuclear watchdog, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), who take a high-profile role in monitoring compliance with international safeguards, identify transport as the most vulnerable area of nuclear security.
Can this possibly make sense? Not according to Dr Large, an independent scientist who has previously used his nuclear expertise both to advise the Royal Navy and to help Russia raise the stricken Kursk nuclear submarine. He is convinced that an urgent review of current transport procedures is necessary:
"Movement of nuclear materials is inherently risky both in terms of severe accident and terrorist attack. At an early stage of my research it became obvious just how vulnerable these spent fuel flasks are. I believe that open publication of the review is fully justified because by putting this information in the open the Government must now, surely, act to protect the public. This means transportation of intensely radioactive spent fuel must cease."
Click here to download a copy of the report.
