Analysis

Viewpoint: Scenarios – the limits of planning ahead

Dr Doug Parr
Dr Parr is Greenpeace's chief scientist
License: All rights reserved. Credit: Steve Morgan / Greenpeace

Scenarios for an imagined future have become key to the debate over UK energy. For every set of policy positions there is a matching scenario – but how useful are they?

A recent report by Cambridge Econometrics – commissioned by WWF and Greenpeace – sought to avoid inventing a new scenario. Its purpose was to examine the different economic impacts of generating the same amount of power from two different energy sources (gas and wind) so it used, as a base, a scenario by Poyry for the Committee on Climate change which allowed the economists to model around key variables with a minimum of re-modelling between the two options.

But it’s easy enough to see why new scenarios happen. Environmental organisations are under pressure to justify their policy demands not just in economic terms – but also explain how they are possible. If you don’t want nuclear – for example – does that not mean you are wedded to even more gas capacity than the Chancellor, George Osborne, is already threatening to work as backup to renewables? The challenge is that high renewables scenarios don’t just involve swapping in one form of generation for another, they mean utilising an entirely different set of tools for our energy future.

There is a good argument that better efficiency would markedly reduce the need for base-load and backup, and that Demand Side Response (DSR) – which uses, amongst other things, smart grids to reduce electricity demand at key times - could make a huge difference to both grid and backup requirements.

In the latter case a report by ECF suggests that DSR across Europe could reduce investment required in grid infrastructure by 10% and in back up generation capacity – which in the UK could be gas - by 35%, assuming 10% of demand could be moved within a day by 2030.

Equally a report on research by the University of Delaware  suggests that wind and solar power with storage could provide power 99.9% of the time in 2030 requiring very little fossil back up, at comparable costs to today. According to studies by Imperial and KEMA and others, interconnection can provide system security across EU with very high renewables penetration and including a reduction in controllable plant.

And many scenarios ignore the reported potential of technologies that contribute little today but are (or could be) on ambitious deployment trajectories, contributing significantly post 2020, for example geothermal power or wave and tidal. Government also seems to think that CCS will come through and be deployed widely, although it has a level of faith and dependence on the technology that seems unwise.

Most of this is not built into most future scenarios.

At the same time, the energy system has had its fair share of failed predictions. In the past decade in UK, sensible energy specialists have expected roof-top wind turbines or micro-CHP to transform energy systems. They were wrong. And no-one really foresaw the impact of shale gas in USA or the collapse in cost of solar photovoltaics. All this says is that predicting change is a mugs game.

So why do scenarios at all? There are two reasons I can think of. One is demonstrating that particular futures are possible. The other is to make us think differently about the present. The latter is more important.

When it comes to predicting how many gas plants we will need, we are in practice trying to solve a problem that will not manifest itself for 12 years. You’ll see in the DECC graph of projected new build gas capacity that there is a bit of new build before 2020 but the large GW come post 2023.

Specifying the numbers needed that far in advance seems to me to be futile - it depends massively on what happens to technology and institutions over the next five to ten years.  That’s not to say Greenpeace never uses scenarios – we do. In crude terms we are trying to get others to see the possibilities we see. They usually involve that great assumption, “using today’s technologies”, which is already a giveaway that it’s sticking a finger in the air. With rapid development and turnaround in technology they become more and more unlikely to be true. Energy infrastructure is not the same as IT but think back to the level of connectivity 12 years ago – the web was scarcely used and even email was pretty restricted. At a time of rapid technological change it takes a visionary like Steve Jobs to predict and – to an extent – create the future. Not an accountant.

So what do we need to do now?

Even according to the Government’s projections we only need a little extra gas up to 2020; less than the capacity consented but not yet under construction. And this depends on, amongst other things, whether we have a triple-dip recession and how fast the proposed demand reduction proposals can be implemented.

What do we need to do now to minimise fossil output and new build:

1)      Maximise market incentives for flexibility mechanisms such as DSR and storage.

2)      Get a regime in place that enhances interconnection above the projects already in planning

3)      Develop and implement the demand reduction proposals as soon as possible.

4)      Incentivise the construction of rapid response Combined Heat and Power (CHP), so that if we do need further gas generation, it is used with the greatest efficiency possible.

And maybe I’ll come back to you on this in a few years time…..

Viewpoint pieces reflect the view of the author and/or his or her organisation. 

The Energydesk team is away over Christmas so whilst the magic of technology allows these stories to be published in our absence we won't be able to respond to comments until 7 January - however we will then do our utmost to get up to speed. Many apologies in advance, Merry Christmas & Happy New Year.