

Greenpeace UK Parliamentary Briefing

Trident 'delay' - are we being fooled again?

January 2011

Summary: false pretences?

The delay in the Trident Replacement programme has been trumpeted by both Coalition parties as something of a victory. David Cameron claims it will both save money and still allow a new generation of nuclear submarines to be built very soon. The Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, believe the delay will give them an opportunity to argue that replacement of Trident would not be in the national interest.

In fact, it seems likely that big savings will not be made from this delay. It also seems that the process of replacing Trident has already begun. Hard questions need to be asked of the government now, before it is too late.

This briefing draws on three publications: the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR); released sections of the still-unpublished Value for Money Review (VfMR) on the future of Britain's nuclear weapons capability; and a more detailed and complementary report, *A Tale of Two Submarines: US Ohio and UK Vanguard submarine replacement in the eye of a fiscal storm*, which will be available from Greenpeace UK in February.


There were two main headlines from the VfMR. The first was that the decision to move to the heavy investment in design and construction of the Vanguard submarine replacement, known as the 'Main Gate' spending decision, is postponed until 2015–16, thereby enabling the next Parliament to vote on (and potentially veto or consider cheaper alternatives to) the decision to build the new submarines.

The second was that this deferment allows substantial savings to be made – £750m over the period of the spending review and £3.2bn over the next ten years – and as a consequence the overall cost of Trident replacement remains within the £15-20bn cost estimate foreseen in the 2006 White Paper on the future of Britain's nuclear deterrent.¹

Neither assumption is likely to be true. While the evidence is inconclusive (as a result of a continuing lack of clarity and transparency about cost estimates and procurement arrangements), it strongly suggests that this may turn out to be a hollow victory for those opposed to like-for-like Trident replacement.

Delay ... or all-systems-go?

This graphic details the CADMID procurement process, used by the MoD when buying equipment.



The programme to replace the Trident system's 'Vanguard' submarines (known as the Future or Successor Submarine Programme²) is currently in 'Concept' stage. Once the 'Initial Gate' stage is passed the 'Assessment Phase' will be authorized. Generally major spending commitments are not made, or contracts placed, until the final 'Main Gate' stage is passed.

The Liberal Democrats and other opponents of Trident replacement are championing the delay to the Main Gate decision because it supposedly keeps open options for alternative systems. As Menzies Campbell recently suggested:³

*Extending the life of the existing Trident fleet will not only save money in the short term; it will allow the opportunity to keep nuclear policy under review, to explore the possibilities of co-operation with the French, and even to consider other alternatives to like for like replacement of Trident. Liberal Democrats would be well satisfied with this outcome.*⁴

However, it is far from clear that this is the case. The Conservative side of the Coalition government has made it abundantly clear that it will maintain a continuous submarine-based deterrent. In a BBC interview in October, David Cameron said: 'I support its proper and full replacement. That replacement is underway already. It will continue to happen during this Parliament'.⁵ The Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, reiterated this position in his speech to the Conservative Party conference on 6 October in which he said the government 'will go ahead with the Trident replacement programme'.

It is equally clear that the work of replacing the existing submarines has already begun. The joint US-UK effort to design a Common Missile Compartment (CMC)⁶ for each country's respective replacement submarine programmes began in 2008 and the UK has already spent over £200m on upfront engineering design activity. In 2007, the MoD's Investment Approvals Board approved a budget for the concept phase work on the successor submarines of £309.5m, £130.5m of which was earmarked for work on the platform and £179m for the propulsion plant – and Liam Fox has confirmed that since the beginning of April 2007 to the end of June 2010 nearly twice this amount had been spent, some £570 million.⁷

In addition, FoI requests have revealed that a long list of contracts for 'long-lead items' are due to be signed after 'Initial Gate'⁸, which the MoD has confirmed is still expected to go ahead early in 2011. Thus, despite an announced four-year delay to both the Main Gate decision, and to the first new submarine coming into service (now planned for 2028), Initial Gate (which was originally due in September 2009) is not being subjected to a four-year delay.

Why the rush?

Responding to a Freedom of Information (FoI) request, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has confirmed that the main categories of long-lead items are expected to be: 'hull structure and structural fittings; primary and secondary propulsion systems; electrical generation, conversion and distribution; various components of the combat systems; and ship services'⁹.

This seems like a significant part of the submarine being purchased *in advance* of Main Gate. However, parliamentary questions seeking further details have been met by evasive replies,¹⁰ while a FoI request on the estimated costs of these contracts and the timing of their placement was declined by the MoD on a variety of spurious grounds, including that disclosure 'would compromise the MoD's ability to obtain value for money from its contractors in the future'.

As a result of the earlier failure to properly scrutinise the contracts for its aircraft carrier programme, the Coalition government has now found that it is cheaper to turn Britain's planned aircraft carriers into floating platforms without any planes than to scrap the project altogether. But the Coalition may well be embarking on a new set of contractual obligations on the Future Submarine Programme that will similarly tie the hands of the next government. We simply do not know, but it is vital that Parliament obtain answers now – by the time of the anticipated review and vote at Main Gate it may already be too late to consider alternatives.

According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), on average, between 10 and 15% of total project costs are spent during assessment phase.¹¹ And the MoD's own 'Smart Acquisition' process advocates that up to 15% of a project's procurement budget should be spent in the assessment phase, before approval at Main Gate, on technology demonstration, project planning and other risk management activities. The spending patterns for earlier UK Astute Class nuclear-powered attack submarines and for the US Ohio Class submarines suggest that this figure is broadly correct.¹² Indeed, it may be on the low side since the MoD has indicated on several occasions that the design and construction phases of the successor submarine programme will overlap. The MoD justifies this as follows:

*Overlapping design and production phases is not something which is unique to the future submarine programme – it is a characteristic of most complex engineering programmes in defence or elsewhere.*¹³

The scope of development and production on the successor programme during the Assessment Phase will also depend on the schedule for completing the remaining Astute class submarines. The two projects are mutually interdependent. Indeed, the role of the last Astute order seems mainly to enable BAE Systems, which manufactures the submarines in Barrow-in-Furness in Cumbria, to keep ticking over until production on the successor submarine can get underway. John Hudson, Managing Director of BAE Systems Submarine Solutions told Barrow's local newspaper recently that given assurances from government (on the successor system) the workforce is likely to 'increase slightly over the next few years'.¹⁴

The bottom line is that the sharp divisions (on paper) between the different phases in the acquisition cycle have become largely meaningless for submarine procurement. There is a great deal of blurring and movement between the various stages, mainly to address supply chain continuity issues. This was all signposted in the government's 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy and a number of subsequent parliamentary committee hearings. In evidence to the Defence Committee in 2006, for example, BAE Systems suggested that any kind of delay in the submarine programme would have a 'catastrophic impact' on the capability of Barrow and therefore of the UK as a whole, to manufacture nuclear submarines.¹⁵

Whether or not this is genuine need — and several independent experts question both the pace of submarine production and the need for Britain to retain such a sovereign capability¹⁶ — it nonetheless drives current industrial and MoD thinking. But they will need to be quick. As Benoît Gomis, of the International Security Programme Chatham House, concludes:

*The government's assurance to BAE Systems that seven astute class submarines and three trident replacement submarines will be built clearly jeopardizes the [Liberal Democrat] party's ability to make the case for alternatives.*¹⁷

Based on a conservative estimate, between 10-20% of the total costs of the successor submarine may be spent during the Assessment Phase prior to Main Gate in 2015-16. This amounts to about

£2-4bn. Who is going to argue for a cheaper alternative (or cancel the project) after that? The Treasury Committee was recently told that the aircraft carrier contract was unbreakable not just for legal reasons, but also because it was inextricably linked to the strategic need to maintain a stable supply of work for the sole warship-producing supplier in the UK.¹⁸ Similarly, for Trident replacement, the evidence suggests that major contracts are about to be placed in order to satisfy the perceived need to maintain a stable supply of work for the sole UK nuclear submarine-producing supplier. **Contrary to the belief that all options are still on the table, these contracts may lead to an ‘unbreakable’ commitment to like-for-like Trident replacement.**

Are the ‘savings’ real?

The 2006 White Paper announced a five-year extension of the life of the Vanguard Class submarine to deliver a service life of 30 years (through to 2024). A further life extension beyond that date was ruled out, in part, on grounds of cost. To achieve that initial five year extension is expected to require three additional ‘Long Overhaul Periods’ (known as LOPs), at an estimated cost of around £1.3 billion between 2014 and 2024.¹⁹

Following the VfMR, however, the Coalition government announced that over the next 10 years £1.2bn will be saved (including £700 million in this Parliament) and £2bn worth of spending will be deferred until after 2020.²⁰ The only details given on the savings were:

- The delay in building a new warhead is expected to save £500m (of an estimated £3bn cost)
- Reducing the cost of building a Common Missile Compartment with the US is expected to save ‘up to £250m’ (but with no details as to how this will be achieved)
- Getting better deals from suppliers via the submarine enterprise performance programme²¹ (which also covers Astute and so may not be a saving specific to Trident replacement) is expected to save £900m; and
- £1bn spending on infrastructure has been deferred.

However, the net savings apparently also include the £1.4bn *additional* costs to further prolong the lives of the Vanguard submarines through to 2028, which Liam Fox announced in a reply to a Parliamentary question on 7 November.²² When the SDSR was published, the Coalition government had simply said that this would need ‘sufficient investment’.

Will the proposed partnership with France on nuclear testing²³ provide additional savings? Given that these cooperation proposals involve building new facilities in France and the UK (to be paid for by both countries) it would seem that this is unlikely, unless there are significant cutbacks to existing plans at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).²⁴

But if it is possible to give the government the benefit of the doubt over its estimated short-term savings, the claim (made in the VfMR) that the cost of designing and building new submarines, warheads and ‘infrastructure’ could still be brought in for £20bn at 2006-07 prices (or £22.7bn at 2009-10 prices) is a re-run of the fantasy economics that regularly bedevil major defence projects.

Indeed, Liam Fox was already backtracking in his 7 November Parliamentary reply, when he said that it was impossible to say whether the delay would end up adding to the overall costs of replacing Trident because ‘no cost will be set out until after Main Gate’ in 2016. (This answer conveniently forgets that the previous government, in response to a Public Accounts Committee report,²⁵ made a

commitment to provide an annual cost report to Parliament – the first of which was due by the end of 2009 and has yet to be published).

This failure to set out estimated costs amounts to a dereliction of Ministerial responsibility. According to the most recent National Audit Office (NAO) report, not making realistic budgetary provision for all likely project outcomes and slowing down projects have resulted in a £3.3bn increase in a single year, 2009-10, in the total cost of the 15 largest defence equipment projects.²⁶ The NAO, Public Accounts Committee and Greenpeace²⁷ have all heavily criticised MoD estimates of both capital and running costs for Trident replacement. A whole series of questions have been raised about the basis of those cost estimates and what was included and excluded from them.

Indeed, the VfMR and SDSR also conveniently forget to mention the running costs for Trident replacement, which were previously acknowledged as 5-6% of the defence budget, or approximately £1.9-2.3bn every year.²⁸

This gives a total official estimate of around £72.9–89.5bn for building and operating a replacement for Trident. But this still excludes:

- Nuclear decommissioning liabilities— anybody's guess for Trident replacement, although existing total MoD nuclear liabilities have been estimated at £9.3 billion (undiscounted cost) and £4.7 billion (discounted cost)²⁹
- The estimated £900m cost of conventional military forces directly assigned to support the nuclear force that should be included in Trident running costs
- The £250m cost of extending the life of the current Trident missiles; the estimated £3bn cost of buying next-generation missiles when the Trident missiles are ultimately withdrawn from service midway through the life of the replacement submarines
- A percentage of the substantial cost of modernising the AWE and building joint facilities with the French.

Thus, the final cost is likely to be closer to £100bn or more than 8.5% of the defence budget every year over the system's 30-year lifetime.

Finally, evidence from the USA suggests that Trident costs may be higher than the UK is anticipating. Given that BAE Systems struggled to deliver the Astute submarine programme and had to be bailed out by US designers from the Electric Boat Corporation, dependency on US expertise to deliver the Future Submarine Programme is likely to extend well beyond the CMC. It also means that cost estimates (and overruns) in the US nuclear submarine replacement programme, known as SSBN(X),³⁰ are likely to be replicated on this side of the pond.

The Congressional Budget Office estimate that a similar 4-boat US fleet of SSBN(X)s — they are actually likely to build 12 — would be around \$47.6bn (\$13bn for the lead submarine, \$8.2bn for each of the next three and \$10bn for R&D) or around £30bn.³¹ This is at least double the £11-14bn estimate for the new UK successor submarines. The possibility of building a new reactor (PWR3), and the safety requirements imposed by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator are likely to increase the cost of the British programme.

Waiting for the USA

The US submarine issue also affects the UK decision more directly, because both nations' submarine projects are intimately linked. Building a successor submarine in advance of US decisions on their SSBN replacement was always a risky strategy.

The D-5 missile and the joint US-UK CMC project are key ingredients that currently link the two nations' submarine-based deterrent programmes. But these connections are unlikely to prevent the US switching to a smaller submarine and/or a different missile that might be incompatible with Trident Replacement, if, further down the line US national interest determines that this is the better option. Such alternatives are being considered by the US Navy via an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) document that was completed in September 2009 and delivered to the congressional defence committees in August 2010. It is clear that the US Navy currently remains wedded to the D-5 missile and SSBN(X) programme, and it would take some serious political pressure from Congress to get them to abandon it – and such a constituency simply does not exist at present. However, there is a risk (small but growing) that financial pressures may lead the United States to consider such alternatives.³²

Whatever happened to transparency?

The Coalition government came to office promising much greater transparency about government decisions. We are told that Trident delay and nuclear cooperation with France are austerity measures that will save the UK hundreds of millions of pounds on the Trident replacement programme. But is this really true? It is difficult to make a proper assessment of the fiscal costs and benefits of these decisions given the paucity of details in the public domain – and especially the failure to make public the VfMR.

In addition to a general promise by the Coalition government to 'throw open the doors of public bodies' a number of other specific commitments on transparency in government contracting have been made. In February, for example, David Cameron said if he won the General Election he would publish in full any contract between government and a third party supplier worth more than £25,000.³³ And George Osborne said:

*Our commitment to publish government contracts in full is the most radical transparency announcement ever made by a British political party – and will enable the public to hold ministers and civil servants to account like never before. This policy will help us to cut government spending, root out waste and empower the public – and bring in a new age of transparency and accountability.*³⁴

Similar commitments were made in the recently published MoD business plan.³⁵ So far, however, the Coalition has failed to honour these transparency commitments for Trident replacement costs and contracts. There also appears to have been a general retreat from earlier commitments for anything deemed commercially sensitive.³⁶ Yet, despite this backtracking, Defence Secretary Liam Fox told viewers of the Andrew Marr show on 18 July that it was important that the VfMR should be published:

*The wider review into the costs of Trident, I hope will be able to be made available as soon as we can do that because I think it's important that the public can see that we've been properly scrutinising the costs of something that we promised as part of our election manifesto.*³⁷

Time to act

It is vital that action is taken in parliament now to shed light on this process before it is too late to influence it. Specifically, concerned MPs should work in parliament to:

- Establish whether (a) long-lead item contracts are being placed in order to maintain weak links in the submarine supply chain or as part of an assessment phase to genuinely inform the Main Gate decision; (b) cancellation fees will apply to the long-lead items for the Vanguard successor submarines; and (c) to what extent, if at all, those contracts are being deferred as a result of the decision to delay
- Press for publication of the VfMR³⁸ and MoD studies on alternatives to like-for-like replacement in order to properly assess the claims being made.
- Press the government to clarify the potential impact of the US navy study for the replacement of the US Ohio class submarines and its implication for the UK successor programme

It is vital that Parliament obtain answers now – by the time of the anticipated review and vote at Main Gate it may already be too late to consider alternatives.

Parliament needs to obtain assurances that long-lead contracts do not bind the next government to a particular course of action. This would enable the next government's SDSR to include a full review of Britain's nuclear weapon capability before the Main Gate decision, and to do so with the benefit of a much more precise costing and risk analysis from the assessment phase.

FOR MORE INFORMATION: Contact Greenpeace on 020 7865 8248.

References

¹ In December 2006 the Labour Government published a white paper entitled *The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent*, which set out the Government's principal recommendations for replacing the UK's nuclear 'deterrent' beyond the 2020s. A debate and vote in the House of Commons on the general principle of whether the UK should retain a strategic nuclear 'deterrent' beyond the life of the current system was subsequently held on 14 March 2007, during which the Government motion was approved by 409 to 161 votes. It should be noted that the White Paper gave an estimate 'in the region of £15-20bn at 2006-07 prices', while the VfMR summary simply refers to a figure of £20bn. It would seem, therefore, that the cost estimate is no longer at the lower end of that spectrum.

² Future Submarines Integrated Project Team Office Officially Opens, BAE Systems, News Release, 12 October 2007, www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_107912125611.html

³ For example, in *Policy options for the future of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons* (April 2010), the Liberal Democrats set out three potential alternative options: a modified Astute submarine with fewer missile compartments or nuclear-capable cruise missiles; a 'virtual deterrent'; or ending Britain's nuclear weapons capability.

⁴ Ming Campbell, 'Delay in Trident replacement saves money and allows for alternatives', posted on October 19, 2010, www.mingcampbell.org.uk/2010/10/19/delay-in-trident-replacement-saves-money-and-allows-for-alternatives/

⁵ Andrew Marr interview with Prime Minister David Cameron, BBC, 3 October 2010.

⁶ CMC Program to Define Future SSBN Launchers for UK, USA, Defense Industry Daily, 29 June 2010, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/CMC-contract-to-Define-Future-SSBN-Launchers-for-UK-USA-05221/

⁷ Hansard – Written Answers, 6 Sep 2010 : Column 176W, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100906/text/100906w0007.htm>

⁸ In UK defence procurement, 'Initial Gate' is a decision point that allows a project to move forward to the 'Assessment' phase. The Assessment phase is meant to involve further detailed refinement of a set of options to enable selection of a preferred solution – see *The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent Capability*, National Audit Office, p18.

⁹ <http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/document/mod-response-foi-request-trident-procurement>

¹⁰ See, for example, HC Deb, 8 November 2010, c4 [www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/debtext/101108-0001.htm#10110810001086](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/debtext/101108-0001.htm#10110810001086)

¹¹ 'Lessons from the report on MoD major projects', David Kirkpatrick, *RUS Defence Systems* June 2009

¹² The early spending patterns on the Astute class don't offer much guidance as to what to expect in the Assessment Phase of the Vanguard successor submarines since the SSN programme started life under a different procurement process. Thus, while the NAO

reports say 'Assessment Phase' spending on Astute was only 1% of total costs (based on Initial Gate and Main Gate *equivalent* decisions in 1991 and 1997, respectively), the inadequate preparatory work in the assessment phase led to cost overruns, delays later in the project and the contract being substantially renegotiated in 2003 and modified again in 2007. Thus, a more realistic reading of Astute would be to ascribe 2003 as a Main Gate2 decision point. At this 2003 'crisis review point', £1,159 million (2003–04 prices) had already been spent on Astute – or over 30% of the forecast costs (in 2010) for the first three boats – including some 'peak expenditure'. The NAO (Major Project Report 2006) lists peak year expenditure on Astute as 2001–02 and 2005–06. For further details see *A Tale of Two Submarines: US Ohio and UK Vanguard submarine replacement in the eye of a fiscal storm* (forthcoming)

¹³ Treasury Minutes on the Fourth to the Sixth, the Eighth to the Eleventh and the Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts 2008–09, Cm 7622, May 2009

¹⁴ Shipyard boss optimistic despite delays on Trident – with video, *North West Evening Mail*, 23 October 2010, www.nwemail.co.uk/news/shipyard-boss-optimistic-despite-delays-on-trident-with-video-1.772102?referrerPath=home/2.3320

¹⁵ Defence Committee: The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base, HC 59, 19 December 2006, pp16–17.

¹⁶ See, for example, Malcolm Chalmers, Continuous-at-sea-Deterrence – Costs and Alternatives, *RUSI Briefing Note*, July 2010

¹⁷ Evaluating the 2010 Strategy Review - Nuclear Deterrent, Benoît Gomis, Chatham House, www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/17636_1010sdsr_gomis.pdf

¹⁸ Treasury Committee - Sixth Report, *Spending Review 2010*, HC 544-I, published 26 November 2010, para 61.

¹⁹ Liam Fox, 22 October 2010

²⁰ A recently issued Trident VfMR 'Fact Sheet' gives a different figure of £3bn saved or deferred. See: <http://download.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sdsr/factsheet10-trident-value-for-money-review.pdf>

²¹ MoD response to the Submarine Enterprise Collaborative Agreement (SECA) Consultation, June 2008, www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A3043837-238B-469D-B7E0-948A39688319/0/seca_consultation_response_jun08.pdf

²² HC Deb, 8 November 2010, c4 [www.publications.Parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/debtext/101108-0001.htm#10110810001086](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101108/debtext/101108-0001.htm#10110810001086); see also: Trident nuclear deterrent delay will cost up to £1.4bn, says Liam Fox, *The Guardian*, 8 November 2010.

²³ The French and British Governments have not yet clarified what they mean by 'testing', but it is understood to mean sub-critical tests along the lines of those currently carried out in the United States. See <http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2239/subcritical-testing-at-top-nor>

²⁴ The cooperation agreement raises a number of questions. Will the AWE hydrodynamics facility (known as Hydrus) be built as planned (in addition to a French facility)? Will other AWE facilities be cancelled? Will the UK use the French supercomputer (and if so why did AWE just pay for the Blackthorn supercomputer – their third this year)?

²⁵ Public Accounts Committee, *The United Kingdom's future Nuclear deterrent capability*, HC 250, Session 2008–09

²⁶ NAO, Ministry of Defence – The Major Projects Report 2010, 15 October 2010

²⁷ In The Firing Line: hidden costs of the supercarrier project and replacing Trident, Greenpeace, 17 September 2009, www.greenpeace.org.uk/media/reports/firing-line-hidden-costs-supercarrier-project-and-replacing-trident

²⁸ The MoD's most recent consolidated accounts for 2009–10 already provide a breakdown of annual 'force elements', which includes £2.5 billion for 'submarines'. Ministry of Defence Consolidated Departmental Resource Accounts 2009–10, 26 July 2010, www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F10E990E-C296-48B1-9838-B3006C1F8DCB/0/mod_ra0910.pdf

²⁹ Ministry of Defence Consolidated Departmental Resource Accounts 2009–10, 26 July 2010, www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F10E990E-C296-48B1-9838-B3006C1F8DCB/0/mod_ra0910.pdf

³⁰ For further details on the SSBN(X) programme, see *A Tale of Two Submarines: US Ohio and UK Vanguard submarine replacement in the eye of a fiscal storm* (forthcoming)

³¹ Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=11527

³² For further details on alternatives to the SSBN(X) and a discussion of the AoA, see *A Tale of Two Submarines: US Ohio and UK Vanguard submarine replacement programmes in the track of a fiscal storm* (forthcoming)

³³ Cameron vows to publish details of contracts worth more than £25,000, Politics Blog, *The Guardian*, 10 February 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/politics/blog/2010/feb/10/david-cameron-publishing-government-contracts

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Business Plan 2011–2015 Ministry of Defence, November 2010, www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/88EA12B8-E08F-4EE4-9963-AFF82DBC665B/0/20101108_mod_business_plan_final.pdf

³⁶ Government Transparency – exclusive!! (Subject to correction from Cabinet Office...), Peter Smith, *procurement excellence*, 23 September 2010, <http://blog.procurement-excellence.com/government-transparency-exclusive-subject-to-correction-from-cabinet-office/>

³⁷ Fox – we need Trident to 'protect Britain', BBC, 18 July 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/andrew_marr_show/8832224.stm

³⁸ The Cabinet Office has refused to release a copy of the VfMR to Greenpeace (cf FOI request). Greenpeace is challenging this decision.