Publication date: October 2006

Summary
On 24 September 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signatures. The treaty banned all nuclear tests - thus stopping new countries acquiring nuclear weapons, and existing nuclear-weapons states from developing new nuclear weapons. Alongside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it was hailed as a major step towards nuclear disarmament.

At the time, the Labour government played a key role in pushing for the treaty and in urging other countries to support it.

This briefing reveals:

• how now, 10 years on, the UK Government risks destroying the treaty;
• how billions of pounds are currently being invested in building hi-tech equipment at the Aldermaston nuclear weapons laboratory;
• that the new facilities planned for the site enable Aldermaston to design and build new nuclear weapons; and
• scientists' concerns that taking a high-tech approach to the virtual design and development of new nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to a return to full scale nuclear testing.
  
  All this is happening prior to any parliamentary or public debate on whether the UK should build a nuclear weapons system. Fundamental questions such as: How are Cold War nuclear weapons relevant to 21st century foreign policy?; What real threats does the UK face?; and 'What effect would building a new bomb have on international disarmament negotiations?' all remain unanswered.

   

Publication date: September 2005

Summary
We now have an extraordinary opportunity to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons. There is no military conflict between the great economic and technological powers. Indeed, they cooperate on a daily basis on trade, investment, health and many other issues. Moreover, the late 1980s and most of the 1990s saw the creation of a positive circle in which citizen action, political initiatives, disarmament treaties and independent verification reinforced each other.

But in May 2005, the impasse at the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) showed that this opportunity may be slipping from our grasp. In these circumstances the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw's subsequent timely call for all states to save the NPT by taking a strong stand on non-proliferation and disarmament is fatally undermined by the UK's continued deployment of its Trident nuclear weapon system and preparations to build a new nuclear weapon. This is in direct contravention of the UK's commitment under the NPT to take progressive steps towards nuclear disarmament, and comes at a time when the Government has admitted that there is no direct military threat to Western Europe and that it does not foresee the emergence of such a threat.

Our revised text

Publication date: April 2004

Summary
At its 2005 Review, NPT Member states must improve on '13 Steps' if the Treaty is to meet its objectives.

Greenpeace is of the view that the NPT's 13 steps should neither be weakened nor renegotiated but should be strengthened by the 2005 NPT RevCon. This is essential if the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and the rule of multilateral implementation of international treaties and law are to survive.

Greenpeace is presenting to the 2004 NPT PrepCom proposed language t at if adopted and implemented by all NPT Member States would take the NPT process further forward to achieving its end goal of "a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Read out revised version of the 13 steps ...

Publication date: April 2004

Summary
At the 2000 Review Conference, Parties to the NPT agreed 13 practical steps towards disarmament. This briefing shows how Greenpeace believes these steps can be strengthened by the 2005 Review.