Publication date: November 2002

Summary
This Review considers the requirements of The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) for the local authority to provide off-site emergency plans in response to all reasonably foreseeable radioactive release incidents from nuclear plants these regulations are now in force and require the local authorities to provide adequate off-site emergency plans in contingency for specific and all reasonably foreseeable accidents and incidents that could result in the release of radioactivity and the declaration of a radiation emergency.

Two radiation incidents are nominated to determine the demands that would be placed on the off-site emergency plans and how the local authorities would cope with a radioactive release incident. The types of radiological incident considered are not full scale releases, being relatively moderate in terms of the total amount of radioactivity available for dispersion and deposition in public areas. These are based i) on an incident involving an irradiated fuel train moving intensely radioactive fuel from a power station to Sellafield, possibly occurring in a densely populated urban area and ii) a release from an operational nuclear reactor (power station) which requires rapid prophylactic countermeasures to thwart the health impact of radio-iodine uptake. Although the transportation of irradiated fuel is specifically exempted from REPPIR, if such an incident did occur then, no doubt, any existing local authority off-site emergency plan would be enacted.

Each of the release scenarios is framed to be just beyond what the nuclear industry considers to be foreseeable and credible accidents, which it determines largely by probabilistic forecasting. This is done for several reasons: First, the tragic events of 11 September introduced the real possibility of future intentional attacks against hazardous plants, so much so that the nuclear safety case has now to give cognisance to intelligently planned incursions rather than resist accidental and mostly random challenges other than to detect and prevent such acts at the planning stage, there is little that can be done to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to terrorist attack. Second, the off-site plan must be sufficiently resourceful to respond to and cope with the unexpected since planning only for the entirely expected would be somewhat meaningless if, that is, the nuclear industry would have us believe that only relatively insignificant radioactive releases can occur at UK nuclear power plants. Third and coupled with the release severity is the capability of the off-site plan to extend beyond the immediate locality of the nuclear plant.Inreal terms, this means extending from the detailed emergency planning zone (DEPZ) of one to three kilometres, out to tens of kilometres.

Publication date: August 2002

Summary
In May 2002, the government began a consultation process to decide how the UK's future energy needs could be met.

The nuclear industry are keen to build at least ten more nuclear power stations. And despite the apparent openness of the consultation process, government and nuclear industry lobbyists are already setting weak targets for renewable energy and undermining democracy.

And there are lots of issues they'd rather not discuss in public - such as the unsolved problem of what to do with our 500,000 tonnes of radioactive waste....

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Summary

Almost 90 per cent of Britain's hazardous nuclear waste stockpile is so badly stored it could explode or leak with devastating results at any time, reported The Observer newspaper on Sunday 30th June 2002.

The information came from a study carried out jointly by two government advisory committees (The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee and the Nuclear safety Advisory Committee). Their report reveals that up to 24 nuclear storage sites around the UK house volatile material that could explode on contact with water, spontaneously combust in the air, or leak in water.

Click on the link above to read the official letters and documentation, describing these 'challenging wastes.'

Despite finding itself in the middle of a radioactive waste crisis that it cannot control, the UK government is actually considering building up to ten more nuclear power stations.

Publication date: November 2001

Summary
Radioactive substances are produced at every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining, to the operation of reactors, to the reprocessing of spent fuel. These include plutonium, caesium, ruthenium, iodine, krypton and strontium. Most will remain hazardous for thousands, and in some cases millions, of years. Despite decades of discussion, the nuclear industry has failed to come up with a safe way of dealing with them. So, as they are released into the environment, building up in the food chain and human bodies, they leave a poisonous legacy to future generations.

Reprocessing is recognised by the government as the largest source of radioactive pollution in the UK i . The plant at Sellafield discharges millions of litres of radioactive water into the Irish Sea. It also discharges radioactive gases into the air. And this pollution is detected as far away as the waters of Norway and Greenland.